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I. INTRODUCTION
Taxes can be generated when a farmer least expects it. Liquida-
tion of assets or forced sales often generate tax liability. In today's
economic climate most farm liquidations, either partial or full, are the
result of severe economic problems.1 Any tax liability created by such
a transfer of property will be incurred at a time when a farmer can
least afford to pay. Yet, taxes are potentially incurred wherever there
is a sale or exchange of property, including exchanges forced by bank-
ruptcy. Taxable income due to a low adjusted basis, recapture of in-
vestment tax credits and taxable gain due to discharge of indebtedness
can create a sizeable financial burden after farm liquidations. Thus, at
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas; J.D. University of California,
Davis (1978); Associate Phebus, Tummelson, Bryan and Knox, Urbana, Illinois
(1978-1983); LL.M. University of Illinois (1985). The author wishes to thank her
colleague, Lonnie Beard, for his invaluable assistance.
1. See the discussion of the farm problems in Harl, The Architecture of Public Pol-
icy: The Crisis in Agriculture, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 425 (1986).
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a time when farmers need economic stability to start over, tax liability
may preclude a fresh start. The actions the farmer took to create the
fresh start, liquidating his or her property, may generate tax liability
which undermines starting anew.
The Ninety-ninth Congress passed legislation which modified this
tax picture somewhat. The alternative minimum tax, which was the
headache of many liquidating farmers in the past, no longer operates.
In fact, certain farmers are entitled to refunds of alternative minimum
taxes paid in the past.2 The 1986 Tax Reform Act added to section 108,
giving relief from discharge of indebtedness tax liability for certain
farm transactions.3 Yet, despite these changes, liquidation of part or
all the farm enterprise can still generate sizeable tax liability.
Nor does it matter that the transfer was involuntary. Foreclosing
on farmland with a low adjusted basis will generate recognized in-
come. Replevying farm equipment may still result in recapture of in-
vestment tax credits. Whenever a farmer is planning to transfer all or
part of the farm property, the tax ramifications should be calculated
even if such planning is necessitated by involuntary seizure. If sizea-
ble tax liability will result, bankruptcy should be considered. Bank-
ruptcy has an impact on some of these potential taxes. This Article
will analyze the tax picture in and out of bankruptcy.
Since this analysis involves the transfer of property, it will be as-
sumed that the farmer is liquidating the farm enterprise under chap-
ter seven of the Bankruptcy Code. It should be noted, however, that a
number of courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have held that a
farmer's assets can be liquidated under a creditor's plan in a chapter
eleven proceeding if no acceptable plan is forthcoming from the
debtor.4 This has been allowed even over the farmer's objection, and
even though a farmer cannot be forced into involuntary bankruptcy.5
The following discussion is limited, however, to liquidating under
chapter seven. Since a liquidation under a chapter eleven plan is not a
sale by the bankruptcy estate,6 the following bankruptcy tax analysis
does not apply to a liquidation under a chapter eleven plan. This is
true even if the case is later converted to chapter seven.7 Therefore,
farmers probably should avoid liquidation under a creditor's plan in
chapter eleven.
Outside of bankruptcy, various tax liabilities are owed for the taxa-
2. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 13208(a), 100 Stat. 82, 321 (1986) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 57(a)(9)(E)).
3. 1986 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 405(a), 100 Stat. -, - (1986).
4. In re Button Hook Cattle Co., 747 F.2d 483, 486 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Jasik, 727
F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1984).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (1982), vests the property of the estate in the debtor when the
plan is confirmed.
7. United States v. Redmond, 36 Bankr. 932, 934 (D. Kan. 1984).
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ble year in which the transfer occurred. Inside bankruptcy, the tax
picture needs to be placed in categories. Bankruptcy tax liability
breaks down into taxes owed before the bankruptcy petition is filed
and those occurring after the petition is filed. This breakdown be-
tween pre- and post-petition debts is a central one for any bankruptcy
analysis,s and the same is true for bankruptcy tax analysis. It should
be noted, however, that the filing of a bankruptcy petition, which
transfers the debtor's property from the debtor to the bankruptcy es-
tate, is not a taxable transfer.9 This issue was cleared up by the 1980
Bankruptcy Tax Act.10 Now there is a clearer division between taxes
arising before and after the petition.11 Yet, some questions remain.
II. PREPETITION TAXES
A. Section 501(a)(7) Taxes
Prepetition taxes can take various forms. For purposes of discus-
sion, they will be divided between taxes incurred for tax years ending
before the year of the bankruptcy filing and taxes incurred in the year
of the bankruptcy filing. For the taxes incurred in years before the
bankruptcy petition was filed, the significant taxes are those included
in section 507(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.12 These taxes are given a
seventh priority for payment' 3 and are not discharged if they are not
paid from the bankruptcy estate.14 If prepetition taxes are not in-
cluded in section 507(a)(7), then they generally will be discharged
along with other prepetition debts.15
Section 507 includes many prepetition taxes, both state and federal.
The ones most likely to be incurred by a farmer are taxes on or mea-
sured by income or gross receipts,16 and property taxes.17 Income and
gross receipt taxes are included in section 507 for taxable years ending
before the date of filing of the petition for taxes due within the three
years preceding the bankruptcy filing. Property taxes are included in
section 507 if they were assessed before filing and were last due within
one year prior to the bankruptcy filing.
Once prepetition taxes are included in section 507 they are changed
8. 1 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (1982).
9. I.IC. § 1398(f)(1) (1982).
10. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 3, 94 Stat. 3389, 3398-99 (1980).
11. I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1) (1982).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (Supp. II 1985).
13. I&
14. id at § 523(a)(1)(A) (1982).
15. It is possible for prepetition taxes not to fall under section 507(a)(7) yet be non-
dischargeable. If a return is not filed for such taxes or filed late but within the
two years preceeding the bankruptcy filing or fraudulently filed, these prepeti-
tion taxes are also not discharged. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)(B), (C) (Supp. 1111985).
16. I& at § 507(a)(7)(A) (Supp. II 1985).
17. I& at § 507(a)(7)(B) (Supp. 1I 1985).
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in two significant respects. First, although unsecured, they are given a
seventh priority.'8 As priority debts, they are paid immediately after
secured creditors receive the value of their collateral. Thus, priority
debts must be paid in full before nonpriority unsecured claims are
paid at all.19 Seventh priority means just what it says; the first six
priorities must be paid in full before seventh priority taxes are paid.
By giving unsecured prepetition taxes seventh priority, the chance this
tax liability will be paid in whole or part by the bankruptcy estate is
increased. But, since it is only a seventh priority this chance is not
great. This is especially true if administration expenses are high, be-
cause administrative expenses receive a first priority.
The second significant aspect of section 507(a)(7) treatment is that
these taxes are not discharged if they are not paid by the bankruptcy
estate.2 0 This is because section 507(a)(7) taxes are included in section
523(a)(1)(A).21 Section 523 specifies which debts are not subject to a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge. Most of the debts included in section
523 deal with debtor misbehavior. Section 507(a)(7) prepetition taxes
are, however, also included.
For most individuals bankruptcy means a fresh start. But, for a
farmer with large prepetition tax liabilities, deep indebtedness to the
IRS even after receiving a bankruptcy discharge is likely. Thus, the
only advantage of bankruptcy over nonbankruptcy with respect to the
above prepetition taxes is that, as a priority claim, these taxes might
get paid out of the liquidation sale proceeds, while other prepetition
debts remain unpaid and are discharged. But, if the farmer does not
have many nonexempt, unsecured assets, the impact of bankruptcy on
these taxes owing for tax years prior to the year of the filing will not
be great. The farmer will still owe the taxes in either situation since
seventh priority taxes are not dischargeable.
B. A Short Tax Year Election
The other type of prepetition taxes which need to be analyzed are
those generated in the taxable year in which bankruptcy is filed. As-
sume that the debtor filed bankruptcy July 1, 1986. The Internal Rev-
18. Id at § 507(a)(7) (Supp. III 1985).
19. Id at § 726(a)(1) (1982).
20. IML at § 523(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). Before the 1984 changes to the Bankruptcy
Code, nondischargeable taxes were section 507(a)(6) taxes. When a new priority
was added in 1984, and taxes were changed to a seventh priority item, the refer-
ences in other bankruptcy sections were not also changed. The reference in sec-
tion 523(a)(1)(A) remained to section 507(a)(6). In the Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-554, § 283(i)(1), 100 Stat. - (1986), a technical correction was made, and the
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enue Code allows the farmer to elect to treat the 1986 tax year as two
short tax years.22 The first year runs from January 1 through the day
before the filing of the petition; that is, from January 1, 1986 through
June 30, 1986. The second short tax year runs from the day the peti-
tion is filed until the end of the taxable year; from July 1, 1986
through December 31, 1986.
If no short tax year is elected the tax year ends on December 31,
1986. Since such taxes would not be due until the end of the year, the
tax would be incurred after the petition was filed. Unlike post-peti-
tion taxes discussed below, however, this post-petition tax is not a tax
incurred by the estate, so the tax would not be affected by the bank-
ruptcy filing.23 Therefore, the farmer would owe these income taxes
and the assets of the estate would not have paid any part of the liabil-
ity. If the farmer has significant tax attributes, such as net operating
loss carryovers, capital loss carryovers, charitable contribution carry-
overs, and/or investment credit carryovers, the effect of filing a short
tax year could be substantial.
The Tax Code provides that the tax attributes which pass to the
bankruptcy estate are those available on the first day of the debtor's
taxable year in which the case commences.24 If the farmer does not
elect to divide 1986 into two short tax years, the tax attributes which
will pass into the estate are those that are available on January 1, 1986.
If, however, short tax years are elected, the attributes which pass to
the estate are those available on July 1, 1986. Assume our farmer had
$20,000 in net operating loss carryovers and an investment credit car-
ryover of $1,000 from previous years. If short tax years are not
elected, $21,000 in tax attributes will pass to the estate and be used by
the estate in calculating the estate's tax liability. Assume the farmer
sold grain in February for $70,000. If no short tax year has been
elected the tax liability arising from the receipt of this income is not a
prepetition debt because it does not accrue until the end of 1986. Such
tax liability will not be offset by the $21,000 in attributes used by the
estate, because the estate succeeded to tax attributes available on Jan-
uary 1, 1986. Nor will this tax liability be paid even in part from the
income generated in bankruptcy by the liquidation of the farmer's
property. Thus, the farmer could be left owing taxes on income gener-
ated prepetition which is not offset by the tax attributes existing
prepetition. Moreover, the $70,000 in income giving rise to the tax lia-
22. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2) (1982).
23. Creditor is defined in § 101(9) of the Bankruptcy Code as an entity that has a
claim against the estate that arose before the order for relief. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)
(1982). Section 301 fixes the order for relief in voluntary cases at the petition
filing. Id. at § 301.
24. I.R.C. § 1398(g) (1982).
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bility became property of the estate.25 Thus, if no short tax year is
elected, a farmer will owe the taxes on the $70,000 income yet not be
able to offset it by the tax attributes or use the $70,000 on which the
tax was based. The situation changes fundamentally, however, if a
short tax year election is made.
By electing short tax years, the first taxable year is from January 1
through June 30, 1986. During this tax year, the farmer has $70,000 in
income and $21,000 in net operating loss carryovers and investment
credit carryovers. Since these tax attributes will be used up in calcu-
lating taxes due for the January 1 to June 30 tax year, no attributes
will be available to pass to the estate when the case commences. Re-
call that the attributes that pass to the estate are the ones available on
the first day of the debtor's tax year in which the bankruptcy proceed-
ing commenced.26 This tax year commenced July 1, 1986. Moreover,
even if there is a tax liability for the first short tax year, this tax liabil-
ity is a seventh priority, prepetition debt which may be paid in part or
in full by assets of the bankruptcy estate.
As can be seen, the election of a short tax year is important in some
circumstances. It should be noted that this election needs to be made
relatively quickly after the bankruptcy filing. This election must be
made on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth full month following
the commencement of the bankruptcy case.27 This is when the return
for the first short tax year is due, and the election can be made with
the return. Once made, this election is irrevocable. 28 Moreover, the
election cannot be made if the debtor has no assets other than exempt
assets. If the debtor has an operating loss in the year the bankruptcy
petition is filed, however, a short tax year should probably not be
elected.
III. POST-PETITION TAX LIABILITY
When an individual files a chapter seven or chapter eleven bank-
ruptcy petition a separate taxable entity is formed: the bankruptcy
estate.2 9 As noted, the creation of this bankruptcy estate and the
transfer of farm property to it is not a taxable transfer.3 0 Section 505
of the Bankruptcy Code sets out the procedures for the filing of a tax
return by the estate.3 ' This section covers taxable activity of the es-
tate and is separate from the second short tax year of the individual
which runs from the first day of the bankruptcy estate as well. The
25. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
26. I.R.C. § 1398(g) (1982).
27. IM at § 1398(d)(2)(D) (1982).
28. Id-
29. IM at §§ 1398(a); 1399 (1982).
30. IM at § 1398(f)(1) (1982).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 505 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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primary tax advantage in filing bankruptcy is that the taxes incurred
by the liquidation of the farm property will be incurred by the estate
and not the farmer. For the most part, this tax liability receives first
priority,32 and to the extent it is not paid it is an estate liability, not a
liability of the debtor. Thus, if the amount of post-petition tax liability
is going to be large, bankruptcy should be considered.
A. Alternative Minimum Tax
The aforementioned advantage of filing bankruptcy is no longer
applicable to the alternative minimum tax. Even though the new tax
legislation eliminates the preferential treatment of capital gains,3 3 and
therefore the alternative minimum tax in most farm transactions, the
alternative minimum tax was a major thorn in the side of farmers liq-
uidating in the past if the transfers involved sizeable capital gains.
Sizeable capital gains used to be a tax preference which the alternative
minimum tax recaptured. Now that capital gains are no longer given
preferential tax treatment, there is no reason to have an alternative
minimum tax for capital gains. Accordingly, the Tax Reform Act of
1986 no longer lists capital gains as a tax preference in the alternative
minimum tax section.34
But, even before the Tax Reform Act, Congress acted to protect
certain farm transactions from the alternative minimum tax bite. In
the spring of 1986, Congress passed legislation to eliminate certain
farm transactions from the alternative minimum tax calculations.35
The legislation was made applicable to transfers after December 31,
1981.36 Even though capital gains preferences have been eliminated,
this provision is still important since it was made retroactive to years
when alternative minimum taxes were paid by many farmers. Thus,
farmers will want to file amended returns if their transaction quali-
fied. It should be noted that the IRS rule which bars amended returns
for tax years more than three years old would preclude an amended
return for 1982.37 Two bills were introduced in the Ninety-ninth Con-
gress to provide an exception to this rule and allow amended returns
32. Id at § 503(b)(1)(B) (1982).
33. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 301,302,311, 100 Stat. -,-(1986).
34. Id- at § 701, 100 Stat. -, - (1986).
35. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 13208(a), 100 Stat. 82, 321 (1986) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 57(a)(9)(E)).
36. Section 701, which eliminates capital gain as an alternative minimum tax item,
does not become effective until December 31,1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514 § 701(f), 100 Stat. -, - (1986). Section 13208 of the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act will control transactions after December 31,
1981 up to December 31,1986. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1986, § 13208(b), 100 Stat. 82, 322 (1986).
37. I.R.C. § 6511 (1982).
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to be filed for 1982.38 Neither bill passed.
Not all farmers will be able to file amended returns. In order to
qualify, the taxpayer must have been a farmer when the transfer oc-
curred. Thus, the taxpayer must have generated for the past three
years fifty percent or more of his or her annual gross income from
farming.3 9 The taxpayer must also have been insolvent at the time of
the transfer and the transfer must have involved farmland.40 More-
over, the exclusion of capital gains for alternative minimum tax calcu-
lations operates only to the extent of the farmer's insolvency.4 ' This
is because section 57(a) (9) (E)(ii) added by the Act, eliminates the capi-
tal gains preference for alternative minimum tax calculations only to
the extent of the farmer's insolvency.42
For example, assume farmer Brown sold land which resulted in
$100,000 capital gain in 1984. The capital gains preference in this
transaction was sixty percent or $60,000. Assume at the time, farmer
Brown's liabilities exceeded his assets by $20,000. Since farmer
Brown's insolvency was only $20,000, the tax preference of $60,000
would only be reduced by $20,000, and $40,000 in tax preference would
still be used for alternative minimum tax calculations. Even though
the new tax bill eliminates capital gains and therefore the alternative
minimum tax on most farm transactions, farmers will want to file
amended returns if their past transaction qualified.
There is a question, however, whether section 13208 applies to
property transfers which occurred in bankruptcy. The question arises
because section 13208 is limited to transfers made by farmers.
"Farmer" is defined as someone who generated at least fifty percent of
his or her gross annual income from farming during the past three
years.43 When the estate transfers property pursuant to bankruptcy
proceedings, however, it is the estate that is making the transfer, and
an "estate" is not a "farmer" as defined by the Act. Yet, there is no
reason this relief from alternative minimum taxes should apply only
for transfers in insolvency situations outside of bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy estate succeeds to all of the debtor's tax attributes pursu-
ant to section 1398(g).44 Under 1398(g)(6) the estate succeeds to the
38. H.R. 4617, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H1985 (daily ed. April 17, 1986)
and S. 2350, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, CONG. REC. S4663 (daily ed. April 17, 1986),
were introduced in the 99th Congress to provide a "window" in the statute of
limitations and allow amended returns to be filed for 1982.
39. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 13208, 100 Stat. 82, 321 (1986) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 57(a)(9)(E)(vii)).
40. Id (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 57(a)(9)(E)(iii)).
41. Id (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 57(a)(9)(E)(i)).
42. Id (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 57(a)(9)(E)(ii)).
43. Id (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 57(a)(9)(E)(vii)).
44. I.R.C. § 1398(g) (1982).
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basis, holding period, and other characteristics of the assets.4 5 Given
this fact, an argument can be made that the estate should also succeed
to the status of farmer as well. Section 1398(g)(8) allows regulations
to prescribe other attributes to which the estate would succeed.46
Such regulations could be promulgated to allow the estate to assume
the attributes of the farmer debtor for purposes of section 13208. Un-
til then, however, it will be difficult to argue that the estate can claim
the benefit of section 13208 for purposes of its own tax return.
B. Gains Realized and Investment Tax Credit Recapture
There are several types of tax liability which can be affected by the
filing of bankruptcy. Several types of tax liability can be generated by
the sale or exchange of property. When the estate sells the farm as-
sets this tax liability will be incurred. Before the Tax Reform Act of
1986, capital gains, recapture of investment tax credits, depreciation,
and soil and water conservation deductions were likely to create tax
liability when the property was sold. Even though the new tax bill
eliminates capital gains and therefore any need for recapture of depre-
ciation, the sale of property will still generate tax liability if a gain is
realized. The elimination of capital gains treatment of a gain will in
fact increase the tax liability. Moreover, even though the new tax bill
eliminates the investment tax credit, the recapture provisions for
credits taken earlier are retained.47 Therefore, even under the Tax
Reform Act, significant tax liability can arise when farm property is
transferred.
The important part of bankruptcy treatment of post-petition taxes
is the fact that most of these taxes are treated as administrative ex-
penses. Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code describes what consti-
tutes administrative expenses. Sections 503(b)(1)(B), and (C) state
that administrative expenses include:
(B) any tax-
(i) incurred by the estate, except a tax of a kind specified in section
507(a)(6) [should be section 507(a)(7)] of this title, or
(ii) attributable to an excessive allowance of a tentative carryback adjust-
ment that the estate received, whether the taxable year to which such adjust-
ment relates ended before or after commencement of the case; and
(C) any fine, penalty, or reduction in credit relating to a tax of a kind speci-
fied in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph;48
The relevant language is "any tax - incurred by the estate". Since
the bankruptcy estate is a separate taxable entity, when the estate
sells the farmer's property the estate incurs the resultant taxes. The
45. Id. at § 1398(g)(6) (1982).
46. Id. at § 1398(g)(8) (1982).
47. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211, 100 Stat. -, - (1986).
48. U U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B),(C) (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985).
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estate must include such tax liability on its tax return.49 Although
section 503(b)(1)(B)(i) is usually used to cover taxes incurred by a
business which continues to operate after the petition is filed, it is
clear that it covers what was capital gain tax liability and is now ordi-
nary income tax liability generated by the sale or exchange of prop-
erty. The Senate Report discussing the types of taxes covered by
section 503(b)(1)(B)(i) mentions capital gains,50 and the one bank-
ruptcy court decision on point so holds.51 Thus, the tax generated by
gain realized by the sale of property is an administrative expense. It
should make no difference that capital gain treatment of gains real-
ized has been eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The taxes
calculated under the old capital gain rules and the taxes calculated
under current tax law are both income taxes generated upon the
transfer of property with a low adjusted basis. The elimination of cap-
ital gains treatment only eliminates a preference. It does not change
the transaction which gives rise to the tax. The elimination of capital
gains treatment will often serve to increase any tax liability.
As an administrative expense, this tax receives a first priority in
payment. Administrative expenses get paid first after secured parties
receive the value of their collateral. Thus, there is a relatively good
chance that these administrative expense taxes will be paid. More-
over, unlike seventh priority prepetition taxes which are not dis-
charged if unpaid, if administrative expense taxes are not paid during
the bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor is not liable for them. This is
because the estate, not the debtor, has incurred the tax. The freedom
from liability is, however, not based on the fact that these taxes are
discharged.
Administrative expenses are not discharged by the bankruptcy dis-
charge. Section 727(b) provides that, except for items listed in section
523, all prepetition debts and post-petition debts turned into prepeti-
tion debts by section 502 are discharged.52 Taxes incurred by the es-
tate arise after the commencement of the case and are therefore not
prepetition debts. Nor does section 502 turn administrative expenses
into prepetition debts.5 3 Moreover, section 523 does not make admin-
49. I.R.C. § 1398(e) (1982).
50. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, re2printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5811, 5852.
51. In re Lambdin, 33 Bankr. 11, 12 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983).
52. Section 727(b) refers to debts incurred before the order for relief. 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(b) (1982). In voluntary cases, the order for relief occurs at the time the
petition is filed. This is also the time the case commences pursuant to § 301. Id
at § 301.
53. Section 502 turns a number of post-petition debts into pre-petition debts. Such
debts include reimbursement claims, id. at § 502(e)(2), breach of contract claims
for contracts rejected under § 365, id. at § 502(g), claims arising when the trustee
recovers property from a creditor, i&i at § 502(h), and post petition § 507(a)(7) tax
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istrative expense taxes nondischargeable. It only refers to section
507(a)(2) and (a)(7) debts. Administrative expense taxes are section
507(a)(1) taxes. Therefore, section 727(b) does not discharge adminis-
trative expense taxes.
However, the fact that the post-petition taxes are not discharged
does not create liability on the debtor for these post-petition taxes in-
curred by the estate. Since the estate is a taxable entity and the estate
incurred the tax, the estate is liable for the tax. Even if the estate
cannot pay the tax liability, the debtor will still be immune from tax
liability.
There is only one section of the Bankruptcy Code which suggests
that the debtor has any liability for taxes incurred by the estate during
the administration of the estate. Section 505 sets out the procedure a
trustee must follow in filing a tax return for the estate.5 4 The section
sets up a procedure for obtaining a prompt audit of the return.5 5 The
section provides that the trustee can ask for a quick audit of the filed
tax return and "the trustee, debtor or any successor of the debtor is
discharged from any liability for such tax" once it is paid.56 Such dis-
charge will only take place, however, if such return is not fraudulent
and does not contain a material misrepresentation, 57 and presumably
it does not occur if the tax is not paid. This suggests that there is some
potential liability of the debtor for taxes incurred by the estate during
the administration of the estate.
An examination of the legislative history of the section demon-
strates the intention of the drafters. The tax liability of the debtor
that section 505(b) concerns is transferee tax liability in the unusual
case that assets are remaining at the end of bankruptcy and are turned
over to the debtor. Extensive comments were made in the House on
September 28, 1978 and the Senate on October 6, 1978 when the Bank-
ruptcy Bill was finally passed. The comments in both houses were
identical when discussing the quick audit procedure set up in section
505(b): "if the trustee does not request a prompt audit, then the
debtor would not be discharged from possible transferee liability if
any assets are returned to the debtor."'58 As a transferee of such as-
sets, the debtor would be liable for any tax for which the transferor,
here the bankruptcy estate, was liable s9 This same rule applies
throughout tax law. When a decedent's estate files the estate's tax
claims, id- at § 502(i). No section treats administration claims as prepetition
claims. Therefore, they are not subject to the § 727(b) bankruptcy discharge.
54. Id at § 505(b).
55. Id. at § 505(b)(1).
56. 1& at § 505(b).
57. I&
58. 124 CONG. REc. 32,414 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); i& at 34,014 (1978)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini).
59. I.R.C. § 6901 (1982) creates transferee liability.
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return, a quick audit is provided like the one provided in section
505(b). If the estate does not pay all of the tax owing, then the benefi-
ciaries, the recipients of the estate's property, will be liable for the
unpaid taxes under transferee liability.60 Thus, section 505(b) should
not be used to create liability where none exists. Transferee liability
is the only liability discussed in the legislative history. Apart from
this transferee liability, the debtor is not liable for taxes incurred by
the estate.
Personal tax immunity is the primary benefit of bankruptcy on the
farmer's tax picture. Outside of bankruptcy the transfer of property
generates the same taxes. The farmer will have lost all or much of his
or her property and could still owe a considerable amount of taxes.
Inside bankruptcy these transfer taxes will be incurred by the estate
as an administrative expense and, even though tax liability remains
unpaid after the bankruptcy payout, the debtor is not liable for them.
However, this benefit of bankruptcy is less clear with respect to
taxes generated by investment tax credit recaptures. Although the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 repeals the regular investment tax credit for
property placed in service after December 31, 1985, the recapture of
credits taken on property placed in service before December 31, 1985 is
still very much alive.6 1 Fortunately, this recapture declines relatively
quickly over time. In general, the amount recaptured is decreased
20% per year for "five year property" and approximately one third per
year for "three year property".62
As was true with respect to taxes on capital gain and alternative
minimum taxes, this recapture-generated tax is incurred after the pe-
tition is filed, when the trustee liquidates the debtor's property. It
seems to be a tax incurred by the estate. Moreover, the statutory lan-
guage in section 503(b)(1)(C) specifically refers to any "reduction in
credit", which includes recapture of an investment tax credit.6 3 But,
the reduction in credit must be "relating to a tax of a kind specified in
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph", meaning it must be related to a
tax incurred by the estate. 64 The problem is that a recapture of invest-
ment tax credits really relates to a tax incurred earlier by the farmer,
which the farmer did not have to pay because the credit was taken.
When the recapture occurs, this in essence gives rise to the taxes
which were not paid at the time the farmer took the credit. Recapture
of investment tax credit taxes are added directly to the farmer's tax
60. Id.
61. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211, 100 Stat. -, - (1986) (to be
codified at 26 U.S.C. § 49(e)).
62. I.R.C. § 47(a)(1) (1982).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(C) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
64. Id.
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liability. If a farmer has a $5,000 investment tax credit recapture, that
farmer owes at least $5,000 in taxes.
This is in part the reasoning behind one court's holding that recap-
ture of investment tax credit taxes are not an administrative expense.
There are only two cases on point, and both of them hold that such
taxes are not administrative expenses. The first of these two decisions
was In re Higgins, where the court gave a number of explanations for
its decision.65 The second case, In re Davidson Lumber Co., merely
followed the Higgins case.66
The Higgins court provided a number of reasons to justify its hold-
ing. First, the tax generated by investment tax credit recapture is not
a tax incurred by the estate, as is required by section 503(b)(1)(B).67
The court explained that although the recapture arguably did not take
place until after the petition was filed, the resulting tax represented
the tax not paid by the debtor when the investment tax credit was
taken. Therefore, the court concluded, the tax was a prepetition tax,
not a tax incurred by the estate. The court stressed that the estate did
not get any benefit from the credit taken.
The second line of reasoning used by the Higgins court was that
the investment tax credit recapture tax was a section 507(a)(6)(iii) tax
[now 507(a)(7)(iii)]. 68 Recall that section 503(b)(1)(B)(i) states that
taxes incurred by the estate are not administrative claims if the tax is
a kind which falls under section 507(a)(6)[now(a)(7)]. Section
507(a)(7)(iii) taxes include "a tax on or measured by income or gross
receipts.., not assessed before, but assessable, under applicable law or
by agreement, after, the commencement of the case." 69 The Higgins
court did not discuss how the investment tax credit recapture tax was
a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts. It did note, how-
ever, that the Bankruptcy Code provided for the prepetition treat-
ment of taxes which arise after the petition. Claims which arise post-
petition and are entitled to section 507(a)(7) priority are treated as
prepetition taxes by section 502(i). Since the court held that recapture
of investment tax credit taxes were included under section 507(a)(7),
section 502(i) was used by the court to make them prepetition debts.70
Note that once a court holds that taxes are section 507(a)(7) taxes,
then such taxes will not be discharged to the extent they are not paid.
The Higgins case was relatively easy to distinguish before In re Da-
vidson Lumber Co. was decided. The bankruptcy petition in the Hig-
gins case was filed on April 28, 1980. The Bankruptcy Tax Act did not
65. In re Higgins, 29 Bankr. 196 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983).
66. In re Davidson Lumber Co., 47 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
67. In re Higgins, 29 Bankr. 196, 201 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983).
68. Id. at 200-01.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(iii) (Supp. 1I 1985).
70. In re Higgins, 29 Bankr. 196, 201, n.7 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983).
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come into effect until early 1981. Prior to the Bankruptcy Tax Act,
the IRS took the position that the transfer of assets to the estate when
the bankruptcy petition was filed was a "disposition" of the assets for
the purpose of triggering investment tax credit recapture.71 This
makes it much easier to view the recapture as a prepetition event and
not a tax incurred by the estate. The Bankruptcy Tax Act changed
this rule. It states that the transfer of assets into a bankruptcy estate
is not a taxable transfer.72 Higgins takes note of this provision, but
suggests that recapture of a credit taken prepetition may still be a
prepetition debt despite the Bankruptcy Tax Act.73 Yet Higgins is a
pre-Tax Act case and therefore can be distinguished.
The bankruptcy petition in In re Davidson Lumber Co. was filed
March 2, 1982 and, although not discussed by the court, the Bank-
ruptcy Tax Act had come into effect.74 The court's holding that the
$62,746 in taxes generated by the recapture of investment tax credits
were not administrative claims cannot be distinguished on the basis of
the Tax Act. Yet, the Davidson decision does not even address the
fact that the transfer which generated the recapture in Higgins was
arguably prepetition since it occurred with the filing of the petition.75
The transfer which generated the tax in the Davidson case was clearly
post-petition since it was the trustee's sale or transfer of the assets on
which the credit had been taken which generated the tax. This is a
weakness in the case.
The question remains whether these two decisions, the only ones
on point, were correctly decided. Should taxes generated by the recap-
ture of investment tax credits be classified as administrative claims or
as prepetition nondischargeable debts? The Davidson decision recog-
nizes that both the House and Senate Reports on the 1978 Bankruptcy
Reform Act discuss investment tax credit recapture. The court re-
mained unpersuaded that the legislative history indicated that recap-
ture taxes were to be treated as administrative claims.76
The original House bill, H.R. 8200, had a section which the House
Report said treated "the recapture of an investment tax credit in con-
nection with the transfer of property in a bankruptcy case as a prepeti-
tion claim, even though the recapture may have occurred after the
filing of the petition."77 This section, section 502(i), was taken out of
the bill by the Senate. The explanation for such action provided in the
Senate Report is somewhat unclear.
71. Rev. Rule 26, 1974-1 C.B. 7; Mueller v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 36, 46-47 (1973).
72. I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1) (1982).
73. In re Higgins, 29 Bankr. 196, 202 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983).
74. In re Davidson Lumber Co., 47 Bankr. 597, 598 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
75. Id. at 599.
76. Id.
77. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 355, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6310.
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The bill, as reported, deletes a provision in the bill as originally introduced
[(former sec. 502(i))] requiring a tax authority to file a proof of claim for re-
capture of an investment credit where, during title 11 proceedings, the trustee
sells or otherwise disposes of property before the title 11 case began. The tax
authority should not be required to submit a formal claim for a taxable event
(a sale or other disposition of the asset) of whose occurrence the trustee neces-
sarily knows better than the taxing authority. For procedural purposes, the
recapture of investment credit is to be treated as an administrative expense, as
to which only a request for payment is required.7 8
Note that this says that recapture of investment tax credits was to be
considered an administrative expense for procedural purposes. This
does not mean that the Senate intended to treat such tax liability as an
administrative claim. Although no conference committee report was
filed on the Bankruptcy Reform Act, there were explanations of the
bill's provisions provided by the Chairs of the relevant subcommittees,
Senator DeConcinni and Representative Edwards. These comments
note that "[s]ection 502(i) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House, but was
[sic] not included in the Senate amendment, is deleted as a matter to
be left to the bankruptcy tax bill next year."79
The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 fails to address the question di-
rectly. The Act did, however, make it clear for the first time that the
transfer to the bankruptcy estate by the filing of the petition was not a
disposition or transfer for tax purposes.8 0 The legislative history of
the Tax Act indicates that this nondisposition rule was intended to
apply to recapture of credits as well as other transfer taxes.8 ' An ar-
gument can thus be made that the Bankruptcy Tax Act did address
the question by clearly making the disposition for credit recapture oc-
cur post-petition.
Another argument based on the legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Code can be made to limit the persuasiveness of the Higgins
and Davidson cases. It is clear that the House initially wanted to treat
investment credit recapture as a prepetition debt.82 Although the
Senate's reason for deleting section 502(i) of H.R. 8200 is unclear, the
act of removing section 502(i) from the Code shows that the treatment
of investment credit recapture is not covered by current Code lan-
guage. The statement in the Congressional Record indicates that the
treatment of recapture of investment tax credits was to be left to fu-
ture action by Congress. Thus, it cannot be argued that recapture
taxes are made prepetition debts by other sections of the Bankruptcy
Code.
78. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMN. NEWS 5787, 5851.
79. 124 CONG. REc. 32,397 (1978); id. at 33,997.
80. I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1)(1982).
81. H.R. REP. No. 833, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-27 (1980); S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 24-32, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 7017, 7038-45.
82. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 502(i) (1978), 124 CONG. REc. 32,359 (1978).
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The current version of section 502(i) was originally section 502(j) of
H.R. 8200. Recall that one of the reasons for the Higgins court's deci-
sion was that recapture taxes were prepetition debts under the then
existing Code. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on section
502(i) to turn the tax generated by the post-petition transfer of prop-
erty into a prepetition debt.83 Although recapture taxes may have
been included under this language when the House initially passed
H.R. 8200, the Senate deleted both 502(i) and 502(j) in its version of
the bill.84 Section 502(j) was put back into the bill under section 502(i)
in the final version of the bill. While explaining the origin of the
502(i) language, the joint statement in the Congressional Record also
explains that the treatment of investment tax credit recapture was to
be left to a future Congress.8 5 Thus, it cannot be argued that the in-
clusion of section 502(i) in the Bankruptcy Code indicates that recap-
ture taxes are to be treated as prepetition claims.
The second statutory section used by the Higgins court to justify its
decision is section 507(a)(7)(A)(iii). Recall that this section includes
taxes "on or measured by income or gross receipts ... not assessed
before, but assessable, under applicable law or by agreement, after,
the commencement of the case".8 6 Also recall that taxes included
under section 507(a)(7) are excluded from administrative expense
treatment under section 503(b)(i)(B). The language of this section is
broad enough to cover any transfer tax liability, including the direct
tax on any gain realized. Yet, the Senate Report describing the types
of taxes included under section 503(b)(1)(B) as administrative expense
taxes states "[i]n general, administrative expenses include taxes which
the trustee incurs administering the debtor's estate, including taxes on
capital gains from sales of property by the trustee... ,"87 In fact, it is
easier to fit taxes on capital gains under this language than it is to fit
recapture of investment tax credit taxes.
A recapture of investment tax credit tax is not "a tax on or mea-
sured by income or gross receipts".88 It is a tax measured by the
amount of credit taken, reduced by the number of years the property
was held.89 The only way recapture taxes can fall within such lan-
guage is to view such taxes as the taxes which were owed by the
farmer when the credit was taken. These would be taxes measured by
income or gross receipts. Because the credit was taken, the income
taxes then owing were not paid. Only by reading the word "tax" in
83. In re Higgins, 29 Bankr. 196, 201 n.7 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983).
84. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 124 CONG. REc. 33,997 (1978).
85. 124 CONG. REc. 32,397 (1978); iti at 33,997.
86. Id-
87. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
88. Id.
89. I.R.C. § 47(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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section 507(a)(7)(A) to refer to this farmer's tax, which was unpaid
because the credit was used, can the recapture of investment tax credit
taxes be considered "a tax on or measured by income or gross re-
ceipts".9 0 Yet, this is not the apparent meaning of the word "tax" as
used in section 507(a)(7)(A).
The taxes covered in sections 507(a)(7)(A)(i) and (ii) are clearly
prepetition. Subsection (i) deals with returns due within the three
years before the petition, and subsection (ii) covers taxes assessed
within the 240 days before the petition. Senator DeConcinni and Rep-
resentative Edwards's statements in the Congressional Record de-
scribe subsection (iii) as covering prepetition taxes which, for some
reason, were not assessed before the petition but, under the statutes of
limitation, could be assessed after the petition.91 The statements indi-
cate that subsection (iii) would include the type of taxes included in
the Senate bill which were precluded from being assessed or collected
before the petition because of pending judicial or administrative
action.
The tax in the only case discussing section 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) fits this
description. In In re Easton the taxes that fell into this section were
from tax years 1978 and 1979.92 The bankruptcy petition had been
filed in March of 1985. An audit in 1984 led to the assessment of addi-
tional taxes for 1978 and 1979. The assessment came twenty-one days
after the bankruptcy filing. These taxes did not fall under subsections
(i) and (ii) of the section 507(a)(7)(A), but the court held that these
taxes were of the type included in subsection (iii) because they were
prepetition taxes not assessed before the petition. There is no indica-
tion in the legislative history or the cases that subsection (iii) was in-
tended to reach taxes generated post-petition.
Thus, it is possible that recapture of investment tax credit taxes are
prepetition debts which receive a seventh priority and are not dis-
charged if unpaid by the bankruptcy trustee. Persuasive arguments
exist, however, that the Higgins and Davidson Lumber cases should
not be followed and such taxes should be treated as administrative ex-
penses that are not obligations of the debtor to the extent not paid.
C. Discharge of Indebtedness Income
There is one other type of tax potentially incurred by the transfer
of property. This is the tax on income generated by the discharge of
indebtedness. The discharge of indebtedness is not itself a tax but can
cause a gain to be recognized on the transfer property and can there-
fore result in tax liability. To understand this gain, recall that when a
90. id-
91. 124 CONG. REc. 32,415 (1978); id at 34,015.
92. In re Easton, 59 Bankr. 714 (Bankr. C.D. IMl. 1986).
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farmer gets a loan, he or she does not have to include the amount of
the loan as ordinary income for that year because the farmer is obli-
gated to pay the loan back. If, however, any part of that obligation to
pay the loan back is forgiven, the farmer is obliged to pay ordinary
income tax for the tax year in which the debt is forgiven. When a
farmer is in financial trouble, he or she may arrange with a creditor to
transfer property in order to pay off the debt. If the property is worth
less than the indebtedness extinguished, this will result in ordinary
income to the farmer of the amount by which the debt discharged ex-
ceeds the fair market value of the property.9 3
Assume, for example, that farmer Brown transferred $200,000
worth of property to discharge $400,000 worth of indebtedness. Before
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, outside of bankruptcy, if the farmer were
solvent, he or she had to add $200,000 to his or her ordinary income.
If, on the other hand, the debt could be classified as qualified business
indebtedness, the farmer would be allowed to reduce his basis in de-
preciable property dollar for dollar for each dollar of discharged in-
debtedness which would otherwise have been added to his ordinary
income.9 4 This allowed a deferral of recognition of the gain. However,
to the extent that the discharged indebtedness exceeded the basis of
depreciable property, it would be ordinary income to the farmer.95
Moreover, if the indebtedness was not qualified business indebtedness
then the entire amount of the discharged indebtedness would have to
be added to the solvent farmer's ordinary income.96
If the farmer were insolvent when the debt was discharged but
made solvent by the discharge of indebtedness then different rules ap-
plied. The then solvent farmer would have recognized ordinary in-
come only to the extent of the discharge of indebtedness income that
was received once the farmer became solvent.97 So, for example,
when farmer Brown transfers $200,000 worth of property to extin-
guish a $400,000 debt, there is a $200,000 of discharge of indebtedness
income. If farmer Brown were insolvent at the time of the transfer by
$100,000, then only $100,000 of the discharged indebtedness income
would have been recognized as ordinary income. Moreover, if this in-
debtedness qualified as qualified business indebtedness, then the same
rules would have applied to this insolvent-rendered-solvent farmer as
applied to the solvent farmer. By contrast, in bankruptcy no dis-
charged indebtedness would be recognized as ordinary income.9 8
93. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931). The farmer must have been
personally liable for the original debt as a prerequisite to the ordinary income tax
liability discussed.
94. I.R.C. § 108(c) (1982).
95. I& at § 108(c)(2).
96. Id- at § 108(a)(1).
97. I& at §§ 108(a)(1)(B); 108(a)(3).
98. Id- at § 108(a)(1)(A).
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The rules in bankruptcy with respect to discharge of indebtedness
are the same as the rules applying to insolvent farmers who remained
insolvent after the transfer.9 9 In both situations, any discharge of in-
debtedness income is not recognized. This forgiveness in bankruptcy
or non-recognition for an insolvent farmer of the taxable income
which would otherwise result from discharge of indebtedness does
have a slight hitch. To the extent the farmer has tax attributes such
as net operating losses, credit carryovers, capital loss carryovers and
basis of property, other than exempt property, retained after bank-
ruptcy, the discharged indebtedness income will reduce these tax at-
tributes.100 This requirement that tax attributes be reduced is also
applicable outside of bankruptcy to insolvent debtors who transfer
property creating discharge of indebtedness.101 Thus, to the extent
these tax attributes could have been used to reduce taxes, the dis-
charge of indebtedness does have some cost, even in bankruptcy. To
the extent the indebtedness exceeds these attributes, however, there
is no reported gain. Moreover, the basis of retained property, if there
is any, will not be reduced below the amount of the farmer's total
debts remaining after the discharge.102 The main benefit of bank-
ruptcy was that to the extent discharged indebtedness exceeded tax
attributes it was not recognized, whereas it would have been recog-
nized by a solvent farmer or a farmer who was rendered solvent by the
indebtedness discharge.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changes this treatment of discharge of
indebtedness income for certain types of nonbankruptcy farm transac-
tions for tax years ending after April 9, 1986.103 Section 405 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 changes sections 108 and 1017 of the Tax Code.
Section 108 now provides protection from discharge of indebtedness
income received by a solvent farmer. It does this by treating the dis-
charge of indebtedness income incurred by agreement between a sol-
vent farmer and an unrelated person, presumably a creditor, as
discharge of indebtedness income received by an insolvent individ-
ual.104 Recall that discharge of indebtedness income received by an
insolvent individual who remains insolvent after the discharge is not
recognized for tax purposes outside the reduction in tax attributes. If
the transfer is not entitled to section 405 protection, however, it will
no longer receive protection under the qualified business indebtedness
exception. The 1986 Tax Act eliminates the qualified business indebt-
edness exception in section 108.105
99. Id at §§ 108(a)(1)(B); 108(a)(3).
100. Id at § 108(b)(1),(2).
101. Id. at § 108(b)(1).
102. I& at § 1017(b)(2).
103. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 405(c), 100 Stat. -, - (1986).
104. Id. at § 405.
105. Id- at § 822.
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Once the discharge of indebtedness income is treated as if received
by an insolvent taxpayer, then the difference between treatment in-
side of bankruptcy and outside of bankruptcy is eliminated. In order
to receive this protection, however, the indebtedness discharged must
be qualified farm indebtedness and the creditor who is discharging the
debt must be a qualified person. Both phrases are defined in the stat-
ute.106 In order to qualify as farm indebtedness three requirements
must be met. First, the indebtedness must have been in connection
with the operation of the farm or must have been secured by farm
lands or farm equipment used in the farming business. Second, the
taxpayer must have received, for the three years immediately preced-
ing the tax year in which the discharge of indebtedness occurs, at least
fifty percent of his or her average annual gross receipts from the trade
or business of farming. Third, immediately before such discharge oc-
curs the taxpayer must have been solvent.
This change provides relief for farmers who were solvent at the
time of the discharge. Without this relief, the full amount of the dis-
charged indebtedness would be ordinary income. The interrelation-
ship of this new section with other provisions in section 108 creates a
potential problem. Recall that if a debtor were insolvent at the time
of the discharge but became solvent because of the discharge, income
will be recognized to the extent of the solvency.107 Yet under section
405 of the Tax Reform Act, which became section 108(g) of the Code,
if a farmer is solvent at the time of the discharge, no income is recog-
nized. Thus a farmer who is $5,000 insolvent at the time $100,000 of
indebtedness is discharged will have $95,000 of recognized income.
Yet if that farmer had $5,000 in equity and was thus solvent at the
time of the $100,000 discharge, no income would be recognized. There
is only $10,000 difference in the financial status of the two farmers, yet
there is a substantial difference in the way they will be treated under
section 108. The more financially distressed farmer may have a much
greater tax liability. This result does not make sense from a policy
standpoint.
Requiring the farmer to receive at least fifty percent of his or her
gross income from the farming enterprise for the three years immedi-
ately preceding the discharge may cause additional problems. This
fifty percent rule allows the farmer to earn some income outside of
farming, something distressed farmers often do. However, certain set-
tlement agreements with the Farmer's Home Administration
("FmHA") involving discharge of indebtedness may not fall under the
protection of section 405 because the discharge of indebtedness may
occur up to five years after the agreement.108 By this time the farmer
106. Id at § 405(a).
107. I.R.C. § 108(a)(3) (1982).
108. 51 Fed. Reg. 45,434 (1986) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1956.57(c)).
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may have left farming, well over fifty percent of his income for the
previous three years will have been non-farming income.
The regulations proposed by FmHa allow several different types of
debt settlements. 0 9 The first of these, "debt adjustments", are de-
fined as agreements to reduce the amount owed when a farmer con-
tracts to pay an agreed sum in monthly payments over a period of time
not to exceed five years. 1 0 "Cancellation" of debt, on the other hand,
is a final discharge of a debt without receipt of any payment from the
farmer."'l Cancellation will not occur often since it can be done only
when FmHA has no security for its loan and the debtor is unable to
pay any part of the debt.112 Third, FmHA could "chargeoff" a debt.
This does not involve any release of personal liability, so no discharge
of indebtedness occurs.n 3 Finally, the debt can be "compromised",
which involves a reduction of the debt in exchange for a payment by
the farmer of a lump sum.114 Adjustment of a debt seems the most
likely scenario. Many farmers would find it difficult to come up with a
lump sum payment required for a compromise, chargeoff does not dis-
charge indebtedness, and cancellation is not attractive to FmHA. Debt
adjustment, allowing the farmer to pay a scaled down debt over time,
may be the most viable option.
Yet adjustment of debts may not fall under section 405. The pro-
posed regulations state that an adjustment is not a final settlement of
a debt until the last monthly payment is made." 5 Payment periods
can extend up to five years. If the farmer does not generate fifty per-
cent of his or her gross receipts for the last three years of the adjusted
payment schedule from farming, the farmer will be in tax trouble.
Section 405 will not apply to the discharged indebtedness, and the
qualified business exception has been eliminated. Therefore, the
farmer will have for that year taxable income to the extent of the in-
debtedness discharged. The only way to avoid this recognition would
be bankruptcy, unless the farmer were insolvent before and after the
discharge of the indebtedness. If the amount of the discharge is at all
large, considerable tax liability could result. Thus, farmers should be
aware of the inherent tax problems in a debt adjustment with the
FmHA.
If a cash sale of farm real estate is involved, then a different regula-
tion applies.1' 6 If farm property, both real and personal, is trans-
109. These regulations only cover the settlement of farmer program loans and single
family housing loans.
110. 51 Fed. Reg. 45,434 (1986) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1956.54(a)).
111. Id (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1956.54(b)).
112. Id at 45,437 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1956.70).
113. Id at 45,434 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1956.54(c)).
114. IdE (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1956.54(d)).
115. Id (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1954.54(a)).
116. Id at 4149-50, 45,440 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1965.26).
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ferred, and Fml-A debt is assumed, still different regulations apply.1l 7
Under both circumstances, indebtedness can be discharged.11s If in
the cash sale, the proceeds do not pay off the loan, FmHA may dis-
charge the remaining indebtedness in certain situations. Discharge of
indebtedness can occur even when FmHA debt is assumed, since the
regulations allow an assumption of debt equal to the fair market value
of the property. If the fair market value of the property is lower than
the outstanding debt, this debt too can be discharged under certain
circumstances. Therefore, section 405 is relevant. The release of lia-
bility must be processed through the county committee, but any dis-
charge of indebtedness requires approval of either the State Director
or FmHA administrator. 119 As long as such a request is processed in
time for the discharge to be within a year after the liquidation, section
405 should apply. Section 405 requires the fifty percent rule to be met
for the three years immediately preceding the taxable year in which
the discharge of indebtedness occurs. Thus, care should be taken
when dealing with FmHA.
The term qualified person as used in the section 405 also creates
problems. Section 405(a) of the Tax Reform Act says "qualified per-
son" means a person described in section 46(c)(8)(D)(iv) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.120 Section 46(c)(8)(D)(iv) states that a "qualified
person" is someone who is actually engaged in lending money other
than someone who is related to the taxpayer, or a person from whom
the taxpayer acquired the property, or someone related to such a per-
son.' 21 This means that if a debt is forgiven by someone related to the
taxpayer or someone from whom the taxpayer acquired the property,
then section 405 of the Tax Reform Act will not cover the transaction.
The Senate Report accompanying the Senate bill which included the
language now found in section 405, states that people related to the
taxpayer were intended to be excluded. 22 The report does not sug-
gest that purchase money lenders were also intended to be excluded.
117. 7 C.F.R. § 1962.34 (1986); 51 Fed. Reg. 4150-56, 45,439-40 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R.
§ 1962.34, 1965.37).
118. 51 Fed. Reg. 45,439-40 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. §§ 1962.34(d), 1965.26(f)(5),
1965.27(f)). The rules are different for cash sales of personal property. 7 C.F.R.
§ 1962.41(e) (1986). To the extent the cash sale does not extinguish FmHA debt,
the regulations provide that release of liability can only occur under a debt settle-
ment. This means such liability release must come under section 1956. If the
amount is partially paid off under a debt adjustment, with debt being discharged,
then the debtor may have trouble fitting under section 405 since the discharge of
indebtedness occurs at the end of the payment period. 51 Fed. Reg. 45,434 (1986)
(to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1956.57(c)).
119. 51 Fed. Reg. 45,439-40 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. §§ 1962.34(h), 1965.26(f)(5)(ii),
1965.27(f)).
120. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 405(a), 100 Stat. -, - (1986).
121. I.R.C. § 46(c)(8)(D)(iv) (Supp. III 1985).
122. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 272 (1986).
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Yet this is the effect of the definition of "qualified person". Thus, for
example, a seller of land who finances the sale would not be included
as a "qualified person". Nor would the equipment dealer be included.
Many credit purchases of farm equipment, however, are financed by
the manufacturer or a related corporation. Unless the seller and the
manufacturer are part of a common control group as defined in section
1563 of the Internal Revenue Code,123 this transaction should not be
excluded since the seller would not be the entity forgiving the debt.
The exclusion of seller financed land purchases is potentially large.
This exclusion may be offset, however, by the inclusion of such a
transaction under section 108(e)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Section 108 in general removes certain transactions from the regular
discharge of indebtedness rules. Section 108(e)(5) states that a debt
arising out of the purchase price owing to the seller which is reduced
outside of bankruptcy and not while the debtor is insolvent is not dis-
charge of indebtedness but merely a reduction in the purchase
price.12 4 The cases on which this statutory language is based supply an
illustration.
Most of the cases arose out of the depression of the 1930's and in-
volved real estate which had depreciated in value. The cases involved
negotiations with the purchase money lender which resulted in the
debtor keeping the property and the lender agreeing to accept less in
order to pay off the indebtedness. The IRS argued that such agree-
ments constituted discharge of indebtedness to the taxpayer. Three
circuit courts of appeal disagreed.12 5 All emphasized that no gain had
occurred. The courts pointed out that there had merely been a reduc-
tion in capital loss. The Hirsch case, followed in the other cases, em-
phasized that no disposition had taken place. The courts held that the
reduction in purchase price merely reduced the basis of the property.
A question exists whether a transaction in which property is ex-
changed for cancellation of indebtedness is covered by section
108(e)(5). By reducing the basis in the property by the amount of the
discharged indebtedness, gain is deferred. But when the property is
simultaneously being transferred at the time the debt is discharged,
section 108(e)(5) may not apply. If such is the case, then forgiveness of
debt by the seller of land could result in discharge of indebtedness
income despite section 405 of the Tax Reform Act. Moreover, if no
discharge in indebtedness income is recognized, the basis reduction
will result in greater taxable gain.
If a discharge of indebtedness does not fall under section 405 and
the transfer is not in bankruptcy, then any discharged indebtedness
123. I.R.C. § 1563 (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985).
124. Id at § 108(e)(5).
125. Hirsch v. Comm'r., 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940); Helvering v. A.L. Killian Co., 128
F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1943).
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
occurring after December 31, 1986 will result in recognized income.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed as of December 31, 1986 the
qualified business exception included in section 108.126 Recall that if
the indebtedness were qualified business indebtedness, recognition of
income could be deferred by reducing the basis of depreciable prop-
erty.1 2 7 This allowed the taxpayer to defer recognition of income until
such property was sold, although it also reduced depreciation deduc-
tions. The Senate version of the Act deleted the qualified business
debt exceptions and the House accepted the deletion in conference.
The Senate Report indicates that the qualified business debt exception
was considered too generous.1 28 Thus, only bankrupt debtors and in-
solvent debtors who remain insolvent after the transfer will receive
the special section 108 treatment of discharge indebtedness income af-
ter December 31, 1986 if section 405 does not apply. It is, therefore,
especially important for a nonbankrupt farmer to fit under the special
exception created by the Tax Reform Act in section 405. Otherwise, as
long as that farmer is solvent or becomes so as the result of the debt
discharge, taxable income will be realized to the extent of the dis-
charged indebtedness.
D. Procedural Considerations
There is one procedural caution that needs to be made other than a
reminder to make various tax elections on time. If a piece of property
is fully encumbered by creditor liens, the bankruptcy trustee may
abandon the property. Since the property is completely encumbered it
is of no benefit to unsecured creditors. Section 554(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code permits the trustee to abandon any property that "is of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate."129 The legislative
history indicates that the abandoned property is to be turned over to
the person with a possessory interest. 3 0 The person with the posses-
sory interest at this point in the bankruptcy proceeding is usually the
debtor. If the trustee abandons property to the debtor, the creditor
with the lien on the property will shortly thereafter ask for relief
from the stay.'31 Once the stay is lifted, the creditor is free to initiate
or continue state collection proceedings. For land this usually in-
volves foreclosure and redemption periods. This means that the trans-
fer to the creditor will probably not take place until after the
bankruptcy proceeding is closed. This has two possible repercussions.
126. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 822, 100 Stat. -, - (1986).
127. I.R.C. § 108(c) (1982).
128. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 161-62 (1986).
129. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (Supp. III 1985).
130. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 92 (1978).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c), (d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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The first concern is that this transfer will now be made by the
debtor, not the estate. Any of the transfer taxes discussed above
might be generated by the transfer, but these taxes will not be in-
curred by the estate. They will be post-petition taxes that are not ad-
ministrative expenses. Nor will the bankruptcy assets be used to pay'
off the tax debt as they would have been had they been given a first or
seventh priority. Instead, the farmer will have to pay these taxes with
post-bankruptcy assets.
On the other hand, if the trustee does not abandon the asset, but
turns it over to the creditor, then the trustee may be making the trans-
fer inside of the bankruptcy proceeding. The transfer taxes would
then have a good chance of being considered an administrative ex-
pense. Thus, the abandonment of property to the debtor may result in
taxes being owed after the bankruptcy when this could have been
avoided.
In addition, abandonment of property to the debtor may have an-
other negative effect on the amount of tax owed by the farmer after
bankruptcy. Recall that when debt is discharged one of the attributes
which has to be reduced is the basis of property retained by the debtor.
The question remains as to when the basis is to be reduced and on
what property. Section 1017(a) of the Internal Revenue Code states
that basis is reduced in any property held by the taxpayer at the begin-
ning of the taxable year following the taxable year in which the dis-
charge occurs. 132 Recall that a separate taxable entity is created when
an individual files a chapter seven petition. At the earliest, the basis
could be reduced when property is turned over from the bankruptcy
trustee to the debtor, a time frame suggested by the legislative
history.133
Even if the basis reduction only occurs in property held by the
debtor when the estate closes, or in the year after the estate closes,
abandoned property may be still held by the debtor at this time. The
risk resulting from abandoning property to the debtor is that its basis
will be reduced, thereby increasing the amount of taxable gains gener-
ated when the property is eventually transferred to the creditor, as it
inevitably will be. As can be seen, the statutory language and the leg-
islative history seem to conflict. If abandoned property is held long
enough, however, then under either interpretation the basis could be
reduced. This too is something the farmer should avoid. As can be
seen, abandonment of property to the farmer may be costly and
should be undertaken only with care.
The IRS is currently considering a revenue ruling which would
change the above analysis. Under consideration is a ruling that would
132. I.R.C. § 1017(a) (1982).
133. H.R. REP. No. 833, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 12 (1980); S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnuN. NEWS 7017, 7029.
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treat the abandonment of property from the estate as a taxable ex-
change. 3 4 This would make any resultant taxes a tax liability of the
estate and not a tax liability of the debtor. This would certainly affect
any tax on gain realized.
Section 1398(f)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code states that trans-
fers from the estate to the debtor in the case of the termination of the
estate are not taxable transfers.135 Any revenue ruling would have to
be based on the assumption that an abandonment of property by the
trustee will occur before the estate is terminated, and therefore sec-
tion 1398(f)(2) would not apply. Only time will tell whether such a
ruling will be adopted. In the meantime a debtor can try to persuade
the trustee that a taxable transfer has occurred.
IV. CONCLUSION
This discussion should alert the practitioner to the importance of
tax planning before any exchange of property takes place. Tax plan-
ning should precede even involuntary dispositions of property. Tax
considerations may be a reason for liquidating inside bankruptcy.
Most importantly, planning needs to be done before any decision on
how to dispose of property is made. Otherwise, tax liability may exist
where such could have been avoided.
134. Cooperative Extension Serv., Dep't. of Agricultural Economics, Univ. of Ill. 1986
Farm Income Tax School at 192-93.
135. I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) (1982).
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